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Agricultural development can contribute significantly to peace by raising incomes and 
employment, thereby reducing the social frustrations that give rise to violence. 
Agricultural growth also generates revenues for governments, allowing them to redress 
the grievances of disadvantaged populations. In this way, growth can be made more 
equitable, an effect that is enhanced if inequalities in access to natural capital, especially 
to land, are addressed as well. Agriculture is critical for countries rebuilding from war, 
especially in making recovery work for the poor. And by raising per capita incomes, 
agricultural development underpins new democracies. Agricultural development thereby 
supports political strategies for peace-building and democratization. 
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The importance of agriculture to development has long been recognized. Agriculture is 
the economic backbone of most low-income countries, a major contributor to economic 
growth, and a large foreign-exchange earner. And most importantly, many of the 
world’s poorest people depend on agriculture for a living. Overall development success 
or failure is often an outcome of what happens in agriculture. 
The connections between agriculture and social peace are less well-recognized than the 
development connections, but they are nevertheless as important (UNU-IAS 2004). 
First, when agriculture fails to meet peoples’ expectations for a better life, the resulting 
frustration can be more readily exploited by demagogues. Poverty is a rich recruiting 
round for criminals and leaders intent on inflaming religious and ethnic hatred; 
development failure is therefore a key cause of conflict. Second, access to the 
productive assets upon which rural livelihoods depend (land, water, forests, and 
fisheries) may literally be a matter of life and death for rural households. They stand 
little chance of achieving food security or a higher income without such ‘natural 
capital’, which is often the centre of considerable, sometimes violent, competition. High 
inequality in access to natural capital therefore raises the risk of conflict. Third, 
participation in world agricultural trade offers both development opportunities but also 
pitfalls; commodity-price shocks can cause deep recessions and, in the worst cases, the 
loss of revenues can cause state failure. Finally, drought and flood can undermine 
agrarian societies and sudden climate change is historically a ‘tipping point’ in the fall 
of civilizations.  
In summary, social peace is closely connected to successful agricultural development. 
National strategies for agricultural development must take this imperative into account, 
and international action must be supportive. This is a demanding set of tasks whose 
complexity should not be under-estimated; national policies too often fail the goal of 
social peace, and international action sometimes undermines promising national 
initiatives. This paper sets out the issues, starting with development failure and its 
agrarian dimension (section 2), and then goes on to discuss rural inequality and the 
related competition over natural capital (section 3) as well as agriculture’s role in post-
conflict recovery (section 4). Poor countries themselves can make improvements in each 
of these areas, but the rich world must act as well, most importantly in the area of global 
agriculture trade which has implications for conflict and security (section 5). Section 6 
concludes by noting that since democracy tends to follow prosperity, agricultural 
development supports political strategies for peace-building and democratization. And 
the paper ends by highlighting the dangers of global climate change for agriculture and 
food security—and thereby to social stability in poor countries.  
2  Development failure as a cause of violent conflict 
Violence has many faces, ranging from domestic violence against women, to fights 
between neighbouring communities, to terrorism, to full-scale warfare involving large 
numbers of combatants. The latter include civil wars (most recently in Angola, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone) and wars between states (the 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia war, for example). 
Poor countries account for nearly all of the 58 different armed conflicts that have taken 
place since the end of the cold war (Eriksson, Sollenberg and Wallensteen 2003). And 2 
violence can continue well after ‘peace’ is declared—many post-conflict countries 
suffer from very high rates of violent crime—and the chances of major conflict 
recurring are high; just over one-third of the civil wars occurring over 1945-96 repeated 
themselves (Walter 2004). This makes it very difficult to apply the label ‘post-conflict’ 
to countries such as Afghanistan and Liberia (Keating and Knight 2004). And such 
persistent conflict represents a great danger to global peace since the international 
effects of long-running wars tend to grow over time; the repercussions of Afghanistan, 
Colombia, and Israel-Palestine reach well beyond their own borders.  
Violent conflict represents a truly catastrophic problem for development. First, there is 
the enormous human cost: ‘more than 3.6 million civilians died during internal conflicts 
in the 1990s and over 50 per cent of the battlefield casualties were children … between 
1980 and 2000 no less than a quarter of the total LDC population, that is about 130 
million civilians, were affected by conflicts’ (UNCTAD 2004: 163). Second, the typical 
civil war costs US$64.2 billion, including the value of the lost output as well as the 
value of the lost life and health (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). In other words, the cost of 
one civil war exceeds the total amount of aid given annually to the developing world 
(US$52 billion according to OECD-DAC estimates). Ending war and keeping the peace 
has, therefore, high economic returns, aside from its humanitarian benefits. 
The economic benefits of ending war are especially high for rural populations, since the 
rural areas of war-torn countries typically bear a very large proportion of the economic 
and humanitarian costs. They are usually less well-defended by governments and in any 
case rebels and government soldiers often live off the land. In the worst cases, food 
output can collapse; during Angola’s long-running civil war, agricultural output fell to 
less than 10 per cent of its pre-war level. As a result, food security deteriorates 
alarmingly, placing large demands on food aid (Development Initiatives 2003). But the 
remotest areas may be entirely out of the reach of humanitarian assistance, resulting in 
major hunger and famine. In Colombia, three million people are internally displaced, 
most of them from rural villages and towns—the largest humanitarian crisis in the 
western hemisphere, and exceeded only by the population displacements in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan.  
2.1  Agricultural development failure and violent conflict 
An important cause of conflict is development failure—the failure of an economy to 
grow and, in the worst cases, a collapse in output and living standards. In an influential 
empirical study, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) identify a low per capita income and a low 
(or declining) growth rate as factors that significantly increase the risk of civil war. And 
a UNU-WIDER study (Nafziger, Stewart, and Väyrynen 2000) assembles considerable 
empirical evidence across a wide range of countries on the consequences of 
development failure for conflict. The relationship is especially evident in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA); the region’s economic performance is the world’s worst, and it 
experienced 19 major armed conflicts over 1990-2002 (SIPRI 2003: 111). Since SSA’s 
economies are predominantly agrarian, overall development failure often amounts to 
agricultural-development failure. 
Some, but certainly not all, of Africa’s poor agricultural performance is rooted in the 
colonial legacy. Many African countries were already fragile, both politically and 
economically, at independence. Their economies were based on the extraction of  
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valuable minerals and export-agriculture by large (European-owned) estates—with 
Africans supplying the labour (sometimes forced). Colonialism also created a class of 
African smallholders producing food for the national market and export crops such as 
cotton for the imperial and global markets. But the needs of African farmers for 
infrastructure and marketing were given a low priority, and their producer prices were 
sometimes kept artificially low for the profit of the colonial administration and its 
imperial power (this was the case in the Belgian Congo, for example: see Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002: 71). The economies of settler colonies such as Angola, Kenya, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe were more diversified, but public investment gave 
overwhelmingly priority to large settler farms over the smallholdings of indigenous 
populations. Many of the newly-independent African governments continued with the 
colonial bias against smallholder agriculture, over-taxing the sector for the benefit of 
politically influential urban groups (and transferring resources from efficient 
smallholder farmers into ill-conceived industrial projects). Such policy bias, together 
with terms-of-trade shocks and the macroeconomic mismanagement of the mineral 
wealth, undermined agricultural output, rural living standards, and government 
finances.1 
By 1980 many SSA countries had per capita incomes below their independence levels. 
Governments began to undertake economic reforms with donor-support but reforms 
frequently broke down, and growth failed to resume; Côte d’Ivoire received no less than 
26 IMF and World Bank adjustment loans, while Zambia had 18 in all—and growth 
was negative in both countries (Easterly 2005). When the public finances were brought 
under control, it was often at the cost of deepening the recession as the economy passed 
through an adjustment process that involved major fiscal restraint (often marked by a 
further fall in already low levels of public spending on rural infrastructure and services). 
Although economic reform is often seen as representing the retreat of the state—with 
the dismantling of market-controls and the privatization of state-owned enterprises—
effective state institutions are still crucial to achieving reform’s intended results (better 
economic management is intensive in state capabilities). Effective reform is therefore 
very difficult to achieve under rapid adjustment because expenditure reductions cut into 
already weak state-capacities (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2003). Some success was achieved in 
restoring agricultural growth to Ghana and Tanzania following an increase in 
agricultural producer prices and marketing reform, but these economies are yet to 
achieve sustained diversification in their non-agricultural sectors.  
The vulnerability of countries to conflict increased when economic reform failed, as it 
often did. Successive structural adjustment programmes were unable to pull Sierra 
Leone out of a deepening economic slump, and some of the reforms had serious social 
costs. Sierra Leone’s public food-distribution system was, for example, dismantled as 
part of an ill-conceived liberalization of agricultural markets required by World Bank 
conditionality (Griffiths 2003). Inept government and increasing poverty contributed to 
a rising sense of frustration, and the young unemployed were easily recruited by 
warlords intent on looting the country’s abundant diamond deposits. The frustration of 
poverty was particularly intense in the rural areas—these had seen hardly any benefit 
from Sierra Leone’s mineral wealth—and many of the fighters were rural born. 
                                                 
1  A resource boom, such as the expansion of oil production, can reduce agricultural producer incentives 
through its exchange rate effect; the resulting cheapness of food imports reduces domestic farm 
income and encourages rural-to-urban migration (an effect that was evident in the contraction of 
Nigerian agriculture in the 1970s).  4 
Economic crises originating in the agricultural sector were contributory factors in the 
Rwandan genocide as well as in Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war. In Rwanda, the patronage 
practiced by the Habyarimana regime was undermined by a commodity price shock at 
the end of the 1980s—a fall in the world price of coffee, Rwanda’s principal export. 
With its revenue base collapsing, the regime increasingly resorted to repression in the 
lead-up to the 1994 genocide (Verwimp 2003). And economic hardship in the rural 
areas fanned the flames of already high levels of distrust between the Hutu and Tutsi 
populations. 
Côte d’Ivoire’s economy boomed during the 1960s and 1970s when world cocoa prices 
were high. Houphouet-Boigny, the country’s first and long-serving president, 
successfully redistributed the country’s cocoa wealth, via a tax on cocoa exports, to 
reduce tensions between the rich Christian south—the cocoa-producing area—and the 
drier, poorer, Muslim north (Azam 1995). However, the collapse of world cocoa prices 
in the 1980s led to an economic slump, which dragged down public revenues, thereby 
weakening the country’s post-independence social contract. This was compounded by 
badly-designed adjustment programmes, and nearly a decade of recession resulted.2 The 
economy eventually improved but not before immense social damage had been done. 
Ethnic demagogues stoked up hatred against northerners as well as against the millions 
of migrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea who had settled in Côte d’Ivoire to 
work in the booming cocoa economy of the 1970s. As in Sierra Leone, the young 
unemployed provided ready recruits, and the country spiralled into war. 
In summary, SSA provides plenty of evidence that development failure contributes to 
raising the risk of violent conflict. And we have seen that development failure is often 
rooted in the agricultural sector. Of course, many other factors contribute to conflict, 
and no mechanistic relationship between economic performance and social stability 
exists. Even in poor societies, strong institutions can successfully contain conflict, and 
channel it into peaceful mechanisms for its expression and eventual resolution (Addison 
and Murshed 2003). For example, Tanzania suffered a substantial fall in per capita in 
the 1980s but, with the exception of tensions in Zanzibar, the country has been mostly 
peaceful.  
3  Inequality as a cause of conflict 
Although a county’s poverty may raise the risk of conflict, civil war and genocide still 
remain comparatively rare events across the entire spectrum of low-income counties. 
When we look at conflict countries, the mostly deadly combination seems to be 
development failure combined with high inequality across groups—what is known as 
horizontal inequality (Nafziger, Stewart, and Väyrynen 2000; Stewart 2001). In his 
1999 report to the General Assembly, Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General, presents the 
argument as follows: 
                                                 
2  Instead of devaluing the CFA Franc—the currency of Côte d’Ivoire and other members of the CFA 
Franc Zone—the government, with the backing of the IMF, the World Bank, and France attempted to 
resolve the crisis by fiscal restraint (which led to deep cuts in public expenditures). This failed to 
restore growth, and eventually the CFA Franc was devalued, thereby encouraging an export recovery 
in the 1990s.  
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In recent years poor countries have been far more likely to become embroiled 
in armed conflicts than rich ones. Yet poverty per se appears not to be the 
decisive factor; most poor countries live in peace most of the time. A recent 
study completed by the United Nations University shows that countries that are 
afflicted by war typically also suffer from inequality among domestic groups. 
It is this, rather than poverty, that seems to be the critical factor. The inequality 
may be based on ethnicity, religion, national identity or economic class, but it 
tends to be reflected in unequal access to political power that too often 
forecloses paths to peaceful change (UN 1999: 2).  
Thus in Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda it was development failure interacting 
with high inequality between ethnic groups as well as between regions that proved to be 
combustible. When development falters, and growth declines, politicians lose the 
resources for closing the gap between competing groups. But even when the economy 
does grow, effective systems of public expenditure and taxation are essential to gather 
the additional resources and to use them for improving services and infrastructure for 
disadvantaged groups (Addison and Roe 2004). In Côte d’Ivoire, Houphouet-Boigny 
succeeded in doing this for a long time, but the mechanisms were eventually 
undermined by macroeconomic weakness, including a commodity-price shock. In Sierra 
Leone and Rwanda there was little, if any, attempt to construct the appropriate fiscal 
institutions to achieve redistributive growth (Ndikumana 2004). And when 
macroeconomic crisis hit these countries, the burdens of adjustment were shared 
unequally across ethnic groups.  
We can also see these forces at work in low-income Asia. Nepal presents a tragic case-
study of underdevelopment combined with high horizontal inequality. The economy has 
neither grown nor delivered better livelihoods for the poorest areas—which have human 
development indicators averaging one quarter of Kathmandu (UNDP 2001)—and the 
resentment has fed support for a Maoist-inspired insurgency. The least privileged ethnic 
groups, who tend to be classified among the lower castes, are the Maoists strongest 
supporters (Bray, Lunde and Murshed 2003). Some 1.2 million households (about 25 
per cent of Nepali households) are landless, and about 1 million out of 6 million 
agricultural labourers are completely landless. Using human development indicators and 
landlessness as explanatory variables, Murshed and Gates (2005) find that the intensity 
of conflict across the districts of Nepal (as measured by the number of deaths) is most 
significantly explained by the degree of inequality.3 Nepal stands little chance of peace 
until these severe inequalities are addressed. 
3.1  Inequality in natural capital: present and future dangers 
High income-inequality in agrarian societies is associated with large inequalities in 
access to the productive assets that are critical to the rural economy: natural capital 
together with infrastructure and services (Carter 2004; Guivant 2003). Such inequalities 
are a common source of insurrection in dualistic rural economies where an 
impoverished peasantry or landless class works for wealthy commercial farmers (Pons-
                                                 
3  The correlation between the intensity of rebellion and landlessness or marginal (very small) 
landholdings is 0.43 (on a scale of 0 to 1), indicating that land issues are a significant motivating 
factor in the support for Nepal’s Maoists (Murshed and Gates 2003).  6 
Vignon and Solignac Lecomte 2004). The result is local, but intense, land wars. In Latin 
America, deep inequality in land as well as in access to related infrastructure, has been a 
strong motivation behind rural rebellion (on the region’s inequalities see De Ferranti 
et al. 2004). In North-East Brazil, the country’s poorest region, seizures of land have 
increased. The leader of the landless movement, João Pedro Stedile, summed it up in 
this way: ‘The peasant struggle includes 23 million people … On the other side are 
27,000 ranchers. That is the dispute. We won’t sleep until we do away with them’ 
(Financial Times, 30 July 2003).  
Inequalities in land and other forms of natural capital are also becoming bigger sources 
of conflict in Africa (Jayne et al. 2003; Mafejie 2003). Conflict and violence in Burundi 
and Rwanda have in part been motivated by problems in access to land (and thus 
household food security) in societies with intense population pressure (Diamond 2005). 
West Africa has seen violence between indigenous farmers and immigrants escaping 
population pressure and drought in the Sahel (this is another factor in the civil war in 
Côte d’Ivoire where southern elites have imposed new restrictions prohibiting non-
Ivoirians from owning land). In Ethiopia, many people barely survive on tiny plots, and 
successive and badly-designed attempts at land reform have often compounded 
problems. The dictatorship of the Derg forced 600,000 people to leave their land in the 
1980s, and to settle elsewhere leading to continuing conflict between the settlers and 
indigenous populations, notably in the Gambella region of southwest Ethiopia. 
Economic reform in Africa has also raised the value of prime agricultural land and 
forests by reducing agricultural taxation, resulting in tensions between communities 
whose access to natural resources is determined by traditional (mostly undocumented) 
title and commercial interests, who are often adept at working the system to obtain 
concessions. In post-war Mozambique large concessions have been handed out to 
commercial farms, mines, and forestry companies to the disadvantage of communities—
non-transparent privatization of state farms is one culprit—and this could be socially 
explosive in the future (Wuyts 2003). 
The land issue is particularly acute in southern Africa and Kenya, reflecting injustice 
against black Africans during colonialism. Kenya has experienced an increasing number 
of local land disputes leading to violence over the last decade. Most recently, the Masai 
have trespassed onto land owned by white settlers, claiming it as their own, arguing that 
the British colonial government misled Masai leaders into signing over their land in the 
early twentieth century. In Zimbabwe, many rural households barely eke out a living in 
the environmentally-stressed areas of the south, generating considerable resentment 
against white-owned farms which dominate the high-potential areas of the country. 
Land reform is necessary for rural poverty reduction in Zimbabwe, and modest success 
was achieved in the 1980s. The present government is, however, unlikely to deliver pro-
poor land redistribution and has indeed perverted the land issue into a means for 
mobilizing support to suppress the country's democratisation movement (Addison and 
Laakso 2003). Chaotic and illegal redistributions of land have largely gone to wealthy 
government members and their supporters, not to the very poor of Zimbabwe, and 
political leaders have cynically manipulated the black squatters who have moved onto 
white-owned land. The terror inflicted on Zimbabwe’s white farmers and their black 
farm workers has resulted in economic collapse and an inflation rate of over 400 per 
cent in 2004, thereby exacerbating the plight of Zimbabwe's poor (many of whom face 
rapidly rising food prices and a weak employment market).  
7 
Land reform remains an urgent issue in South Africa, reflecting the gross inequality and 
discrimination of the apartheid years that left 87 per cent of land in the hands of whites 
who comprise less than 10 per cent of the population. This is especially the case in 
KwaZulu-Natal where large commercial farmlands sit alongside the old KwaZulu 
homeland (of apartheid years), with intense land pressure among rural households, and 
conflicts over grazing rights between households and commercial farmers, sometimes 
leading to violence. The government has undertaken a substantial land reform 
programme without alienating large-scale farmers as in Zimbabwe, and has made most 
progress in settling restitution claims (for land seized during the apartheid years). Some 
3 per cent of land has been transferred to blacks, with the goal of transferring 30 per 
cent by 2015, a process that will have to be accelerated if South Africa is to avoid 
turning land into a wider political issue—which it will become if the black populations 
becomes dissatisfied with the rate of progress to date (International Crisis Group 2004: 
xxi). In the meantime, the economy needs to achieve very fast growth if it is to create 
non-farm employment (alongside increased public spending to redress the racial 
imbalance in human development indicators). This can provide an alternative livelihood 
for rural households, and contribute to reducing the very high rates of rural crime and 
violence which are exacerbated by high levels of male unemployment.  
4 Agriculture’s  role  in  post-conflict recovery 
In moving from conflict at least two objectives exist. First there is peace: the end of 
mass violence. Second, there is broad-based recovery: improvement in the well-being 
of the majority of people, especially the poorest (where we measure well-being by a 
range of indicators including household income and expenditure as well as non-
monetary indicators such as health and literacy). Crucially, achievement of the second 
objective does not inevitably follow from the first. A peace that follows the decisive 
victory of one warlord over all others, or of a rapacious government over a rebel 
movement, offers little promise that the victors will help the majority of the population 
to recover. Instead, the country’s elite may reap the gains and, indeed, the well-being of 
the majority may grow worse over time if the wealthy use the opportunities of peace to 
grab valuable assets for themselves. The very poor, who have the least secure assets and 
the least political power (especially when they live in remote rural areas), are 
particularly vulnerable. 
Moreover, the chances of the poor in peace depend in part on what has been done to 
help them during war. It is hardly necessary to spell out the human impact of war which 
fractures communities, destroying human and social capital (Addison and Baliamoune-
Lutz 2004). But unless the state disintegrates completely—the case of Somalia in the 
early 1990s—it is still possible to manage the wartime economy to contain further 
impoverishment and to try and preserve human capital and livelihoods (if not enhance 
them, for the eventual peace). For example, with the assistance of donors Mozambique 
initiated rural development in safe areas during the country’s civil war. However, the 
necessary political commitment is often missing. During Angola’s long civil war, the 
government achieved far less for the poor than Mozambique’s wartime government 
despite Angola’s far greater resources from oil and other minerals. International 
humanitarian efforts that go beyond food aid to transfer skills and education to refugees 
can improve their prospects once post-conflict reconstruction begins; Mozambican 
refugees who received such assistance had higher living standards two years after their 8 
resettlement than those that did not (de Sousa 2003). This should be a priority in 
redesigning refugee policy responses (Helton 2002). 
Aid donors must increase the resources available to meet the post-war needs of poor 
communities: the recent acceleration in debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative is intended to raise public spending on the key social 
sectors, see, for example (Addison, Hansen and Tarp 2004). But for aid and debt relief 
to fulfil their promise it is essential to build effective public expenditure management 
and service delivery so that the additional external resources reach their intended, pro-
poor, uses (livelihood projects, basic health care and primary education, etc.). Regional 
and ethnic grievances over the allocation of public money often contribute to conflict 
when the disadvantaged become frustrated over their lack of access to infrastructure and 
services. In Central America, rural and indigenous populations have for long expressed 
their resentment at discrimination in spending which typically favours urban groups and 
large landowners. Guatemala’s civil war was fed by such grievance. Peace agreements 
may promise to redress the situation, but effective public expenditure management and 
service delivery are essential to match actions to words, and this will often entail 
considerable reform.  
But even so, there will be many demands on domestic and external resources and 
therefore we need to avoid ‘wish lists’—long lists of everyone’s favourite projects 
(which simply distort and overwhelm national capacities). Instead, there needs to be a 
focus on core priorities—those that give the most return to broad-based recovery—and 
considerable investment in the collection of information on the needs of communities 
and poor people. Moreover, since different measures of well-being do not necessarily 
move in the same direction, nor by the same amount, it is important to capture these 
different dimensions in data collection; for example households’ sense of 
empowerment, their economic well-being, and their human development indicators do 
not move in lock-step, and indeed some may show improvement, and some 
deterioration, pre- and post-conflict (see Richter 2004 on Timor Leste, for example). 
Timely information on well-being should then be embedded in the institutional 
processes that formulate policies—especially in allocating public expenditures—as well 
as in the arena of political debate (in regular briefings of parliamentarians and the 
media, for example). Otherwise, democratization will not be fully beneficial for the 
poor. 
‘Community’ is a useful shorthand term for discussing common problems, nevertheless 
there is significant stratification (and conflict) within and between communities, 
especially over natural capital (the Rwandan genocide is the most tragic example).4 War 
also accentuates local inequalities. In Mozambique, for example, households with 
access to the wartime shadow economy (such as the black-market in food aid) and 
connections to local-level elites gained and accumulated assets which facilitated their 
post-war recovery (Wuyts 2003). In contrast, poorer households often fell further 
behind (losing land and livestock, for instance), thereby weakening their ability to 
participate effectively in reconstruction projects and to adapt to economic reforms.  
Moreover, women are often at a significant disadvantage within communities in earning 
a living. In Eritrea, women suffered discrimination in the post-conflict job market and 
                                                 
4  Bijlsma (2005) discusses conflict over natural capital and the environmental dimensions of post-
conflict development.   
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discrimination in access to land despite formal legal equality with men (and despite 
playing a major role in the military forces that fought for independence). In 
Mozambique, the incidence of poverty in households headed by women is often much 
higher than in male-headed households; in the Manica region, one of the poorest rural 
areas, 47.1 per cent or so of female-headed households are poor, compared with 38.9 
per cent of male-headed households (de Sousa 2003). Human development indicators 
for women are much worse than those for men in Afghanistan, Angola, and the DRC—
to name just three conflict-affected countries. This lack of human capital makes it 
difficult for women to participate fully in reconstruction and to take advantage of the 
new livelihood opportunities resulting from economic reform (especially in export 
agriculture which offers considerable potential for higher incomes). 
A rapid rebound from war requires strong and sustained private investment, both 
domestic and foreign. Investment by large private wholesalers in recreating grain 
markets was crucial to improving food security in post-war Mozambique, for example 
(Tschirley and Santos 1999). This activity has improved the efficiency of the national 
grain market and reduced consumer price margins, a benefit particularly for food-deficit 
and poor households. Foreign direct investment in the agricultural sector has also 
contributed to Mozambique’s strong post-war economic growth. 
The state can encourage private investment by providing macroeconomic stability; 
Ethiopia has had considerable success in this regard, and Mozambique managed to 
significantly reduce the very high inflation that prevailed at the end of the war. In 
contrast, Angola and the DRC have experienced prolonged periods of hyperinflation, 
particularly in the prices of basic commodities, that have worsened poverty. Well-
designed public investment can also do much to encourage (‘crowd-in’) private 
investment. Better telecommunications and road infrastructure for remote areas make 
them more attractive to potential investors, and strengthen community livelihoods, for 
example. Remoter areas often have deep poverty, and they must be given priority in 
public investment decisions. 
It is also critical to quickly strengthen property rights through tenure reform, otherwise 
the poor lose out to the wealthy and powerful in the land-grab that can occur in the 
immediate years of peace. Land was an important factor in Sudan’s civil war, and the 
January 2005 peace agreement with the secessionist rebels of southern Sudan is unlikely 
to hold unless the land issue is vigorously addressed. Thus one close observer of the 
country, Alex De Waal (2005), concludes that: 
One way the commercial elite makes money is through mechanised agriculture, 
which is as socially disruptive as it is ecologically damaging. It was the 
southward march of tractors, ploughing up smallholders’ farms, that drove 
many Sudanese peasants to join the rebels. Will the opening up of the 
country’s most fertile plains, closed by war for 20 years, simply mean the 
carpetbaggers resume their expropriations? Without equitable rural 
development, the seeds of conflict will again be sown. 
Finally, the domestic and aid resources used in rebuilding infrastructure and services 
will have low returns if policies that hold back the livelihoods of smallholders and 
micro-entrepreneurs are retained. A thorough and early reconsideration of sector 
policies—especially towards agriculture which is the main livelihood of many of the 
poor—is therefore needed. Similarly, macroeconomic policy exerts powerful effects on 10 
the relative incentive to invest in agriculture versus other sectors of the economy. Bad 
sector and macroeconomic policy can more than offset the good work of local 
livelihood-projects; for example, overvaluation of the currency cheapens food imports 
and thereby reduces the incomes of domestic food producers, and also decreases the 
incentive to produce agricultural exportables. Projects to build better livelihoods for 
communities will fail without macroeconomic reform. 
5  The implications of global agriculture trade for conflict and security 
Much more needs to be done to improve the benefits of agricultural growth for poor 
people by means of land reform, micro-credit, and pro-poor investments in 
infrastructure and research—to cite just three key areas of intervention (de Janvry et al. 
2001; World Bank 2003). And while the last decade has seen considerable effort in 
moving forward on the gender dimensions of agricultural development, it is still early 
days in improving the access of women to key productive assets and in reducing the 
discrimination that impedes their livelihoods. National initiatives in these areas can 
yield large benefits, but that yield is much affected by how the global economy 
operates, particularly in the area of international trade (Addison 2005).  
It is indisputable that a well-functioning system of world agricultural trade is vital to the 
achievement of post-conflict recovery as well as to the Millennium Development Goals 
more generally. For post-conflict countries which do not have abundant mineral 
resources, agriculture is the mainstay of their economies and the chief motor for revival. 
Indeed, given the difficulties that are encountered in utilizing mineral revenues for 
broad-based development in resource-rich countries (Angola, DRC, and Republic of the 
Congo, for example) agriculture is often the best prospect for pro-poor recovery in these 
countries as well. However, world trade in agriculture is heavily distorted by tariffs, 
quotas, and export subsidies to domestic producers and there is considerable concern 
that protectionism by rich countries retards the growth of a key sector for poor 
counties—and may indeed offset much of the benefit of foreign aid as well. Moreover, 
protectionism in agriculture by developing countries themselves can impede the 
development of south-south trade (see Anderson 2004: 551). Since economic growth 
tends to reduce the risk of civil war, and trade can be an engine of growth, it follows 
that efforts to reform the world agricultural trade may contribute to conflict reduction in 
a broad way.  
However, two points of caution must immediately be made. First, major structural 
constraints hold back the agricultural exports of poor countries, and substantial private 
and public investment in infrastructure, services, and marketing are essential to realize 
the gains from trade (UNCTAD 2004). These are especially severe for post-conflict 
countries; hence the need for prioritizing agriculture in budgetary and aid allocations 
(see the preceding section of this paper). Second, liberalization of world agricultural 
trade has some serious costs for developing countries, which must be set alongside the 
benefits. The elimination of rich-country subsidies to domestic food producers will raise 
world prices, and this is a serious concern for food-importing nations—45 of the 49 
least-developed countries import more food than they export (Panagariya 2003: 22). The 
cost of food is a politically explosive issue given the severe impact that sharp and 
sudden food prices have on the welfare of both the urban poor as well as the substantial 
numbers of the poorest rural households who are food-deficit as well. And some  
11 
developing countries benefit from preferential access to rich world markets, notably 
those enjoying privileges under the EU trade policy, and a reduction in EU 
protectionism will adversely affect their export earnings. This will entail major 
economic adjustments by them, with potentially severe strains on their social fabric. 
The case of cotton most clearly illustrates the impact of rich-country protectionism. 
Developing-country cotton producers face a world price which is depressed by the large 
subsidies that the EU and the US pay to their domestic farmers. In an average year, the 
EU spends €900 million (US$1.07 billion) on cotton subsidies, while 25,000 American 
cotton farmers enjoy a subsidy that can be as high as US$3.7 billion in a peak 
production year such as 2001-2002. These subsidies depress the world price, especially 
the US subsidy since the US is the single largest cotton-exporting nation (accounting for 
40 per cent of world trade). Without the US subsidy, world cotton prices would have 
been at least 12.6 per cent higher between 1999 and 2002 (Alden 2004). Hence, the US 
subsidy lowers farm income in the developing world, as does the EU subsidy.5 
Cotton also illustrates the link between trade and peace. In the West African states of 
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, the elimination of rich-country cotton subsidies would 
raise growth, since cotton is one of the few crops in which the Sahel region has a 
comparative advantage. This would strengthen the region’s political stability by 
lowering the frustration of the young unemployed—thereby also reducing the attractions 
of militant Islam which is actively recruiting among the Sahel’s predominantly Muslim 
population. And it would contribute to reducing tensions in West Africa’s coastal 
nations which have seen large immigrations of people from the Sahel who are desperate 
for a livelihood (particularly to Côte d’Ivoire where resentment against immigrants 
contributed to the country’s civil war).  
Restoring Afghanistan’s production of output of cotton, which collapsed during the war 
and turmoil of the last two decades, is essential not only for rural reconstruction but also 
for encouraging farmers away from cultivating poppies for the country’s thriving opium 
economy. This is a major challenge given that for farmers the per acre revenue from 
wheat—the main alternative crop at present—is one-twentieth of that from poppy. The 
Taliban cracked down on opium production, but following their downfall, production 
has resumed; over 324,000 acres were sown with poppy in 2004, up from 198,000 acres 
in 2003. The IMF puts the value of Afghanistan’s opium trade at US$2.6 billion a year 
(equivalent to 60 per cent of the country’s GDP). This, together with the revenues 
provided by traditional smuggling, provides the country’s warlords with revenues to 
match those of the government (for comparison, the 2003-04 development budget is 
US$1.8 billion).  
The world sugar market is equally distorted to the disadvantage of the developing world 
as a whole. The EU provides a subsidy of €3.30 for every Euro of sugar that Europe 
exports (Oxfam 2004). The total cost of the subsidy, the value of which varies 
depending on how you add up the indirect subsidies, is between €1.3 billion and €1.5 
billion. Without the subsidy, the world price would be significantly higher and the cost 
to three African producers—Ethiopia and Mozambique (both post-conflict countries) 
                                                 
5  Brazil has taken the US cotton subsidy to the WTO. In April 2004 the WTO made a preliminary 
ruling that the US cotton subsidy was excessive, boosted US exports and depressed prices at the 
expense of Brazilian and other producers, and therefore breached US obligations to the WTO. In June 
2004, a WTO dispute panel upheld the preliminary ruling, against which the US will now appeal. 12 
and Malawi (at peace but very poor)—has amounted to US$238 million since 2001 
(Oxfam 2004). However, sugar also illustrates the point that some individual developing 
countries will lose heavily from world trade liberalization since they presently enjoy 
preferences giving them access to the high prices of the protected EU market. Under 
liberalization Mauritius and Swaziland will lose out to more efficient producers, notably 
to Brazil (see Gibb 2004). 
In summary, world agricultural trade liberalization has the potential to raise growth in 
many developing countries, but there are also significant costs to some individual 
countries. If the loss of export earnings slows their economic growth, then it will raise 
their risk of conflict. From the perspective of agriculture’s role in conflict reduction, it is 
therefore important for the international community to assist their adjustment process. 
But here we run up against the stagnation of aid flows over the last decade. The annual 
flow of official development assistance, which presently averages US$52 billion, could 
be more than doubled out of the savings available by reducing the US$300 billion a year 
spent by rich countries on farm subsidies (of which the EU spends US$57 billion). And 
there are new and innovative ways of mobilizing additional public and private financial 
flows which need to be explored further (see Atkinson 2004 for proposals). Priorities for 
using the additional aid must include agricultural research for small farmers, especially 
in environmentally-stressed areas which receive too little help at present, and for 
women farmers whose livelihoods are often especially fragile. Their futures depend on 
the larger global task of mobilizing more development finance.  
6 Conclusions 
This paper has explored the links between agricultural development and peace. 
Agricultural development can contribute significantly to peace by raising incomes and 
employment, thereby reducing the social frustrations that give rise to violence. 
Agricultural growth also generates revenues for governments which, if they build 
effective revenue collection and public expenditure systems, will help them to redress 
the grievances of disadvantaged populations. In this way, growth can be made more 
equitable, an effect that is enhanced if inequalities in access to natural capital, especially 
to land, are addressed as well. Agriculture is critical for countries rebuilding from war, 
especially in making recovery work for the poor. And by raising per capita incomes, 
agricultural development is an important foundation stone for new democracies, since 
the survival chances of a democracy rise as it income grows (Addison 2003). 
Agricultural development thereby supports political strategies for peace-building and 
democratization. 
Unfortunately, too little attention is presently given to the role of agricultural 
development in creating peaceful livelihoods, especially for the world’s poor. Too many 
poor-country governments continue to under-invest in smallholder agriculture and rural 
micro-enterprises; their public spending budgets do not reflect the needs of rural people 
for better economic and social infrastructure and services. And foreign aid from the rich 
world has stagnated—as a percentage of their GDP it is now below the level of the 
1960s—and the effectiveness of this aid is undercut by rich-country protectionism in 
agricultural markets. Such short-sighted trade policy not only hinders development and 
poverty reduction in the poor world, it also undermines their peace and security. And  
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since conflicts in poor countries have global effects, rich countries undermine their own 
security by neglecting the lives and livelihoods of the poor.  
The rich and the poor worlds also have a common interest in addressing global climate 
change. Unless rapid action is taken, global warming resulting from increased 
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide in the atmosphere will 
most likely inflict great damage on the world’s agricultural systems by reducing 
cultivable land (through flood and drought) and crop yields. Plant and animal species 
will be lost with uncertain, but almost certainly severe, effects on agricultural systems 
(Root et al. 2003). Recent estimates suggest that 15-37 per cent of land plants and 
animals could eventually become extinct as a result of climate changes expected by 
2050 unless there is a rapid move to carbon sequestration and the adoption of 
technologies that do not produce greenhouse gases (Pounds and Puschendorf 2004). 
Otherwise food security will be undermined resulting in large-scale population 
displacement which is bound to be detrimental to peace and stability in the world at 
large.  14 
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